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of those records. The indigence of most criminal-record-victims indicates
the need for inexpensive administrative remedies. Due to the limited
number of such remedies in Missouri, however, the criminal-record-victims
may be forced to rely on judicial remedies and courtroom challenges.
Finally, there is a great need for aggressive action by the Missouri General Assembly to enact simple, comprehensive legislation designed to foster
justice for criminal-record-victims seeking employment.
JOHN KURit

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-NONCONTRACTUAL
INDEMNITY-THUE EFFECT OF THE ACTIVEPASSIVE NEGLIGENCE THEORY IN MISSOURI
I. INDEMNITY AND CONT=IBUTION IN MISSOURI

At common law a tortfeasor who discharged a liability owed to an
injured third party could not seek to recoup any of the loss from any person alleged to be partially or fully responsible for the injury. In short,
there was no right of contribution or indemnification between joint tortfeasors at common law.1 Today, this inflexible rule has been abrogated,
and it is generally accepted that under the proper circumstances,' a tortfeasor may seek contribution or indemnification from another who may
also be liable for the same wrong.2
It is important to distinguish between contribution and indemnification. While both doctrines are based on equitable principles,3 each'is different in application and effect. Contribution distributes the loss among, tortfeasors who are in pari delicto4 by requiring each to pay his'pjro rata
share.5 In Missouri the right to contribution is granted by siatute, but
1. One reason is that the common law would not allow a tortfeas6r to bring
an action based on his own misconduct. Note, The Joint Tort-Feasor in. Missouri,
25 WAsiI U.L.Q. 572 (1940). For other reasons, see Note, Toward a Workable
Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65 COLUJ. L. REv. 123 (1965).
2. See Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Propb~cd Rationale, 37 IowA L.'REv. 517 (1952); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between

Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932).
3. See Note, The Joint Tort-Feasor in Missouri, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 572

(1940). The doctrines of contribution and indemnity were developed in an attempt to achieve fairness: "[T]he obligation to indemnity is not a consensual
one; it is based altogether upon the law's notion-influenced by an equitable background-of what is fair and proper between the parties." Leflar, supra notd 2, at
146-47. The doctrines are consistent with the fault principle of tort law. Meriam
& Thornton, Indemnity Between Tortfeasors: An Evolving Doctrine in the New

York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 845 (1950).
4. Tortfeasors in pari delicto-i.e., persons equally culpable, are, precluded
from asserting a claim for indemnity. See note 15 and accompanying text infra.
5. W. PRossE, HANDBOOK OF Tim LAw OF TORTS § 103 (4th 'ed.' 1971);
Annot.,
A.L.R.3d
943 (1969).
'
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is limited to situations where a judgment has been rendered against, joint
tortfeasors in a single action. 6 Thus, a tortfeasor's right to contribution in
Missouri is conditioned upon the injured party bringing suit and obtaining a judgment against two or more tortfeasors. Because nothing in the
statute requires a plaintiff to bring an action against multiple defendants,7 a tortfeasor's right to contribution in Missouri rests in the hands of
8
the injured party.
The theory of indemnification allows a tortfeasor who has been compelled to discharge a liability to shift the entire loss to another who in fairness should bear it. 9 Non-contractual indemnity is based on principles of
restitution or unjust enrichment-the notion that a person is unjustly
enriched when another discharges a liability which arose from the former's
unlawful conduct. x0 In such instances, the law implies a contractual obli6. Section 537.060, RSMo 1969 provides:

Defendants in a judgment founded on an action for the redress of

a private wrong shall be subject to contribution, and all other consequences of such judgment, in the same manner and to the same extent as
defendants in a judgment in an action founded on contract. It shall' be:
lawful for all persons having a claim or cause of action against. two or
more joint tort-feasors or wrongdoers to compound, settle with, and discharge any and every one or more of said joint tort-feasors or wrongdoers
for such sum as such person or persons may see fit, and to release him or
them from all further liability to such person or persons for such tort.or
wrong, without impairing the right of such person or persons to demand
and collect the balance of said claim or cause of action from the other
joint tort-feasors or wrongdoers against whom such person or persons
has such claim or cause of action, and not so released.
The statute gives a right to contribution only when a judgment has been
rendered against joint tortfeasors. Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d -799 .(Mo. En
Banc 1961). A joint judgment makes a prima fade case of contribution, but contribution may be denied based on the law of indemnity, resulting in one judgment debtor bearing the entire loss. Hays-Fendler Const. Co. v. Traroloc Invest.
Co., 521 S.W.2d 171 (Mo. App., D. St. L., 1975).
7. See State ex rel. Cunningham v. Haid, 328 Mo. 208, 212, 40 S.W.2d 1048,
1050 (1931):
The statute relating to contribution, referred to in the opinion;
creates rights and obligations as between defendants in a judgment
founded upon an action for tort. It imposes no duty whatever upon the
plaintiff with respect thereto. It neither requires plaintiff to bring- his
action against all of the joint-tortfeasors, nor does it require him to ob-.
tain a valid judgment against all whom he does elect to sue.
8. It has been questioned whether such a result is fair. See Note, The Joint
Tort-Feasor in Missouri, 25 WAsm. U.L.Q. 572, 589 (1940):

It seems anomalous that contribution, a remedy for the promotion of
justice and equity between joint tort-feasors, should be thus dependent
on the personal whim of the injured party.
9. W. PROSSER, supra note 5. See RESTATEMENT OF REsTiTUTION § 76 (1937):
A person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is
owed by him but which as between himself and another should have
been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity from the othe,.
unless the payor is barred by the wrongful nature of his conduct.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs, § 886 B, comment c .(Tentative
Draft No. 18, 1972):
The basis for indemnity is restitution, and the concept that one person.
is unjustly enriched at the expense of another when the other discharges
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/10
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gation on the party unjustly enriched to indemnify the other who suffered
the loss and thereby achieve a fair result between the parties."1
Missouri courts have recognized three situations in which non-contractual indemnification between tortfeasors is allowed: (1) where one party
was held liable because of a legal relationship with the person actually
causing the wrong; (2) where liability was based on some "positive rule
of common or statutory law;" and (3) where the person discharging the
liability had merely failed to discover and correct a dangerous condition. 12
The tortfeasor allowed indemnity in these situations is said to have been
"constructively, ....
derivatively," or "secondarily" liable compared to the
"primary" liability of the indemnitor.13
. The right of non-contractual indemnification is foreclosed on a showingth at both tortfeasors actually participated in the wrong-i.e., are in
pari delicto.14 Tortfeasors in pari delicto are only entitled to contribution,
and in Missouri must meet the requirements of the contribution statute.16
Unlike contribution, the right of indemnification in Missouri is not
goveried by statute nor conditioned on an injured party obtaining a
judgment against multiple tortfeasors.1 6 It is therefore important to determine the circumstances in which a tortfeasor in Missouri may assert
liability which it should be his responsibility to pay .... This has not
been always dearly recognized by the courts, and they have usually
granted indemnity ...without reference to a pervading principle....
The principle of indemnity was invoked to circumvent the inflexible rule against
contribution at common law. Comment, Toward a Workable Rule of Contribu.
tion in the Federal Courts, 65 CoLuM. L. Ruv. 123 (1965).
11. An implied contract arises between the tortfeasors that imposes the
obligation to indemnify on the tortfeasor who should bear the ultimate liability.
41 Am. JuR. 2d Indemnity § 19 (1968); Leflar, supra note 2. The tortfeasor discharging the liability must have been legally obligated to do so; tortfeasors unable
to demonstrate the legal obligation are deemed "volunteers" and cannot maintain an action for indemnity. See, e.g., Southwest Mississippi Elect. Power Ass'n
v. Harragill, 254 Miss. 460, 182 So. 2d 220 (1966).
12. The three situations were recognized without elaboration in Kansas City
Southern Ry. v. Payway Feed Mills, Inc., 338 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Mo. 1960), and
further 'explained in Wright, Procedure-Third Party Practice-Non-Contractual
Indemnification,28 Mo. L. RPv. 307, 309 (1968). Agency relationships fall into the
first category, and liability imposed on a person by statute for actions of another
would fit into the second category. The third situation, the failure to discover
a dangerous condition, is the classic example of passive negligence. While the
third situation is often phrased as a "failure to discover or correct a dangerous
condition," "discover and correct" is more accurate because mere knowledge of
the dangerous condition has been equated with active negligence. See note 45 and
accompanying text, infra.
13. Enis, Civil Procedure-The Active-Passive Negligence Indemnity Theory,
30 Mo. L. R.rv. 624, 625 (1965). For other examples of nomenclature, see Robbins
v. Chicago, 71 U.S. 657, 670 (1866) ("party immediately in fault"); Shannon v.
Massachusetts Bonding &,Ins. Co., 62 F. Supp. 532, 540 (W.D. La. 1945) ("the
wrongdoer in the physically participative sense and the wrongdoer in the legally
relative sense").
14. See, e.g., Union Elect. Co. v. Magary, 373 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1963).
15. 42 C.J.S. Indemnity §§ 21, 27 (1944). Only tortfeasors who are not in
pari delicto are allowed indemnity. See, e.g., Feinstein v. Edward Livingston &
Sons, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Mo. 1970).
16. Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. En Banc 1961).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
1976
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the right of non-contractual indemnification and thereby shift the entire
loss to another-lr This article will discuss the right to assert claims for
non-contractual indemnification in products liability cases in Missouri, 8
and how that right is affected by the active-passive negligence indemnity

theory.1 9

II.

THE AkrvE-PAssrvE NEGLIGENCE INDEMNITY THEORY

A general discussion of the active-passive negligence theory is important to understand its impact on the right to indemnification in the
products liability area. It appears that this theory is an outgrowth of primary-secondary liability, described in part I, supra.2 0 The fundamental
principle of the active-passive negligence indemnity theory is that a tortfeasor who is passively negligent may recover indemnity from a tortfeasor
who is actively negligent.2 1 The problem involves distinguishing between
conduct which constitutes active negligence and conduct which constitutes merely passive negligence. One Missouri court has stated:
[T]he principle of indemnity applies where one party creates
the condition which causes injury and the other does not join
therein but is exposed to liability on account of it. The negligence

of the party responsible for the dangerous condition is active and
primary
while the negligence of the other is passive and second22
ary.

This distinction is based on the character of the negligence and not on a
2
difference in the degree of negligence between tortfeasors in pari delicto. 3
17. Claims for indemnity may be sought in the original action brought by
the injured party as a cross-claim, counter claim, or third party petition. 3 FRumR
& FRiEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIAILTY § 44.05 (1975). For a discussion of third party
practice and indemnity in Missouri, see Wright, Procedure-ThirdParty PracticeNon-Contractual Indemnification, 28 Mo. L. REv. 307 (1963).
18. To what extent the right to indemnity may be affected by a contractual
provision for indemnity is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Annot.,
supra note 5, at § 8 (c).

19. For discussions of the active-passive negligence indemnity theory in general, see Meriam &Thornton, supra note 3; Leflar, supra note 2; Davis, supra note
2; Enis, Civil Procedure-The Active-Passive Negligence Indemnity Theory, 30

Mo. L. Rxv. 624 (1965).
20. Wright, Procedure-Third Party Practice-Non-ContractualIndemnification, 28 Mo. L. Rlv. 307 (1963); Enis, Civil Procedure-The Active-Passive Negli-

gence Indemnity Theory, 30 Mo. L. Rlv. 624 (1965).
21. See McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463
(1952) (implying that a passively negligent tortfeasor can also recover indemnity
from another also passively negligent).
22. State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Godfrey, 468 S.W.2d 693, 698 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1971). The active-passive terminology as applied in an indemnity situation should not be confused with the active-passive negligence that describes conduct in connection with landowner liability with respect to persons injured on
the premises. See Enis, Civil Procedure-The Active-Passive Negligence Indemnity

Theory, 30 Mo. L. REv. 624, 625 n.11 (1965).
23. See, e.g., Crouch v. Tortelot, 350 S.W.2d 799, 806 (Mo. En Banc. 1961);
Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 325-26, 77 A.2d 368, 370 (1951).
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to active-passive negligence indemnity situations in Missouri. Union Elect. Co. v. Magary, 373 S.W.2d 16 (Mo.
1963).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/10
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The most common situation occurs when one tortfeasor has created the
danger to the injured party, and the other has merely failed to discover
the danger and remedy it.24 It is active negligence to create the dangerous
condition, but passive negligence to fail to discover and remedy it.25
The earliest cases that allowed indemnity based on the different characterization of negligence between tortfeasors involved the liability of
municipalities for injuries which occurred on streets and sidewalks, when
the municipality had not created the dangerous condition. 20 In such
cases, the municipality was subject to liability based on its general duty
to keep streets and sidewalks safe and was entitled to indemnification from
the landowner or other tortfeasor who had created the danger to the plaintiff. The negligence of the municipality was the failure to discover and
remedy the dangerous condition (passive negligence), and indemnity was
allowed against the tortfeasor who had actively created the dangerous
27
condition.
The right of indemnification based on the active-passive dichotomy
was later extended to cases involving landowners who were held liable
for injuries caused by dangerous conditions on their property.2 The landowner was entitled to indemnity from a person who had created the condition if the landowner's negligence consisted only of the negligent
failure to discover and remedy the condition. 29 The same reasoning was
applied to contractors held liable for injuries caused by the active negli-

gence of subcontractors.3 0 It soon became apparent that the right of indemnification was not to be limited to particular fact situations, but extended to all cases where one person was held liable for the injuries
caused by the active negligence of another.3 1
24. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at § 51.
25. See, e.g., Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Payway Feed Mills, Inc. 338
S.W.2d 1, 9 (Mo. 1969). The court approved the following jury instructions:
The jury is instructed that the terms passive or secondary negligence
mean . , . a failure to discover or correct a defect or to remedy a dangerous condition caused by the act of another who is primarily responsible.
The jury is further instructed that the terms active and primary negligence mean the act of creating a dangerous condition which under all
other facts and circumstances present is likely to cause injury to others.
26. Wright, Procedure-Third Party Practice-Non-ContractualIndemnifica.
tion, 28 Mo. L. Rrv. 307 (1963); Comment, Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in New
York: Active and Passive Negligence and Impleader, 28 FODHAA L. Rv. 782
(1960). See City of Springfield v. Clement, 205 Mo. App. 114, 225 S.W. 120 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1920).
27. See authorities cited note 26 supra.
28. Comment, supra note 26, at 784.
29. Id. See Western Cas. & Surety Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 413 S.W.2d 550 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1967).
30 Comment, supra note 26, at 784-85. See Hays-Fendler Const. Co. v. Traroloc Invest. Co., 521 S.W.2d 171 (Mo. App. D. St. L. 1975).
31. Comment, supra note 26. See also Meriam & Thornton, supra note 3, at
858:
[I]t can be stated that the indemnity principle is a broad one -which
apparently has application to any situation in which there is such a
significant factual disparity between the delinquency of one tortfeasor
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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The active-passive negligence indemnity theory can be easily expounded, but the application of the theory to particular fact situations
has been difficult. This is because the terms "active" and "passive" are
only expressions of the conclusion that, under the facts presented, equity
requires the ultimate liability to fall on the person who "ought" to bear
it.32 While itis difficult to predict how the equities should balance in
any given case, some general observations can be made that may help
the practitioner determine whether indemnity is available under the activepassive negligence theory.
To recover indemnity under this theory, a tortfeasor must allege and
prove: (1) he is guilty only of passive negligence-i.e., has not participated
in the wrong; and (2) the prospective indemnitor is guilty of active negligence-i.e., created the dangerous condition.3 3
If the claim for indemnity is sought by way of counterclaim, crossclaim, or impleader, the court, after a motion to dismiss the indemnity
petition, must scan both the allegations of plaintiff's petition and the
petition filed against the prospective indemnitor.3 4 If there is any possibility that the necessary allocation of active and passive fault could be
established by evidence presented at trial, the indemnity petition should
not be dismissed. 35 Once the evidence has been presented, the court should
look to the instructions upon which the jury will base its verdict. If plaintiff submits his case against the tortfeasor-indemnitee based on a theory of
active negligence, the indemnity petition should be dismissed. 36 If, howand the delinquency of another as to persuade the court to call one's

wrongdoing "passive" and the other's "active."
Missouri courts have only recently adopted the active-passive negligence terminology. The evolution of the doctrine in Missouri is traced in Enis, The ActivePassive Negligence Indemnity Theory, 30 Mo. L. Rav. 624 (1965).
32. See Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Ra-

tionale, 37 IowA L. REv. 517, 542 (1952):
[I]t should be clear that the "passive-active negligence" standard-a
test which can depend on the manner of expression of a fact situation,
and which is inherently unsuited to certain types of indemnity cases,
is not a helpful key to the indemnity tangle.
See also Note, Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in New York, 39 COmaELL L.Q. 484,
499 (1954): "[T]he words active and passive negligence must be understood
as names for findings of fact and not as rules in themselves."
33. See Meriam 9. Thornton, supra note 3. Participation in the wrong constitutes active negligence. See, e.g., Campbell v. Preston, 379 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1964).
34. See, e.g., Feinstein v. Edward Livingston & Sons, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 789,
792 (Mo. 1970).
35. See State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Godfrey, 468 S.W.2d 693, 697 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1971):
To determine whether a case for indemnity exists we look to the
allegations of the plaintiff's ... petition and the third-party petition. If
from those allegations some possibility of liability over appears, the thirdparty petition should be permitted.
It is important that the tortfeasor's petition state a case for indemnity and not
merely assert a defense to the plaintiff's claim. See Johnson v. California SprayChemical Co., 362 S.W.2d 630 (Mo. 1962).
36. Active negligence bars the right to indemnity. 42 C.J.S. Indemnity §§ 21,
27 (1944).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/10
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ever, plaintiff submits on passive negligence or multiple theories of active

and passive negligence, the jury could render a verdict based on passive
negligence, and therefore the tortfeasor should be allowed to submit to
the jury his claim for indemnity against the prospective indemnitor.
Similarly, if indemnity is sought in a separate action based on a
judgment paid by the tortfeasor, the action should be dismissed if it is

shown that the verdict rendered in the original action established the
indemnitee's active negligence.8 7 If, however, the court in the indemnity
action finds that the original verdict could have been based on passive
negligence, the tortfeasor should be allowed to prove the active negligence

of another and recover indemnity. While the determination of active or
passive negligence is ordinarily left to the trier of fact,88 the interpretation

40
89
of verdicts is a matter of law to be decided by the court. Settlements
and verdicts based on res ipsa loquitur 4 l do not establish the character of
the negligence of a tortfeasor.
The classic example of passive negligence is the failure to discover
and remedy a dangerous condition.4 2 To what extent further participation
in the wrong amounts to active negligence and forecloses the right to
indemnity is not always clear. Mere motion does not turn passive conduct
into active negligence, 43 but conduct which violates a statute appears to
be per se active negligence. 44 Having knowledge of the dangerous condi-

37." See, e.g., Hofstra v. Schriber, 475 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1972).
38. Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Payway Feed Mills, Inc., 338 S.W.2d I
(Mo. 1960); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463
(1952). See Meltzer v. Temple Estates, 203 Misc. 602, 605, 116 N.Y.S.2d 546, 549
(Sup. Ct. 1952), stating that if the question of active-passive negligence is clear,
the court will decide the issue as a matter of law, but when "there is room for a
reasonable difference of opinion concerning the comparative culpability of
joint tortfeasors, the question of 'liability over' will be given to the trier or triers
of facts."
39. See Hofstra v. Schriber, 475 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1972).
40. Allied Mutual Gas. Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 279 F.2d 455 (10th
Cir. 1960); Western Gas. & Surety Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 413 S.W.2d 550 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1967).
41. A joint judgment based on res ipsa loquitur does not establish the
character of the negligence as between the tortfeasors. Crystal Tire Co. v. Home
Service Oil Co., 525 S.W.2d 317 (Mo. En Banc 1975). But see State ex rel. Siegel
v. McLaughlin, 315 S.W.2d 499, 504 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958) ("the pennissible inferences of negligence under that doctrine and the circumstances pleaded would
be active and concurrent negligence"). The fact that tortfeasors are sued jointly
does not establish that the tortfeasors were in pari delicto. See Sisco v. Nu Process
Brake Engineers, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1971).
42. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. Magary, 373 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1963); Listerman v. Day & Night Plumbing & Heating Serv., 884 S.W.2d 111 (Spr. Mo. App.
1964). Application of the rule to the facts is not always a simple process. See Falk
v. Crystal Hall, 200 Misc. 979, 105 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1951), afrd mern., 279
App. Div. 1071, 113 N.Y.S.2d 277, appeal denied, 304 N.Y. 987, 108 N.E.2d 410
(1952), where the principal authorities stating the rule were relied on by both
tortfeasors.
48. See Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Payway Feed Mills, Inc., 888 S.W.2d

1 (Mo. 1960).

44. Cush v. Pittsburgh, Chartiers & Youghiogheny Ry., 157 F. Supp. 360
(W.D.byPa.
1957); of
Hughes
Co. Scholarship
v. La Mear
Poultry1976
& Egg Co., 242 S.W.2d
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tion and not remedying it,45 or negligently remedying it, 4 6 constitutes active negligence; but a tortfeasor with knowledge who delegates the duty to
remedy the condition to another is entitled to indemnity from the other
who fails to remedy it.4 Active negligence can be an act of omission as well
as commission, 48 but it has been said that an act of commission cannot be
passive negligence.4 9 The following Missouri cases will serve to illustrate
these principles.
Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Payway Feed Mills, Inc.50 has been
cited as the first Missouri decision to utilize expressly the active-passive

negligence terminology in connection with a claim for indemnity. 51 A railroad settled a claim based on the Federal Employers' Liability Act by
paying $15,000 to a switchman who had been injured when a railroad
car collided with a moveable loading dock. The railroad's liability had
been predicated on negligence in failing to provide a safe place to work.
The railroad company sued and recovered indemnity from the owner of
the loading dock, alleging active negligence in placing the dock too close
to the railroad tracks. The owner had charged that the railroad could have
discovered and remedied the danger, and that its failure to do so coupled
with the movement of the railroad car constituted active negligence.
Thus, the railroad was alleged to be in pari delicto with the owner and
therefore unable to assert a claim for indemnity. 2 The Missouri Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the failure to discover and remedy a danger285 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951) (applying Ohio law). But see Stahlberg v. Hannifin
Corp., 157 F. Supp. 290 (N.D.N.Y. 1957).
45. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Temple Estates, 203 Misc. 602, 116 N.Y.S.2d 546
(1952). See also 3 FRUMER 9. FREDsmA, PRODUCSs LrABILrY § 44.04 (1975).

Knowledge of the defect means actual knowledge. See Note, Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors in New York, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 484, 499 (1954). However, it has been
stated that failure to discover a patent defect constitutes active negligence. Crawford v. Blitman Const. Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 398, 150 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup. Ct.),
appeal denied, 2 App. Div. 2d 746, 153 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1956). See also RESTATEMENT OF RE=STTUTiON § 95 (1937):
Where a person has become liable with another for harm caused to
a third person because of his negligent failure to make safe a dangerous

condition of land or chattels, which was created by the misconduct of the

other or which, as between the two, it was the other's duty to make safe,
he is entitled to restitution from the other for expenditures properly made
in the discharge of such liability, unless after discovery of the danger, he
acquiesced in the continuation of the condition.
46. See, e.g., De La Forest v. Yandle, 171 Cal. App. 2d 59, 340 P.2d 52
(1959); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952).
47. See McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323

S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959).

48. See Schipper v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 278 F. Supp. 743, 745 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) ("Acts of omission as well as commission may constitute active negligence."). An act of omission would be a failure to warn when there is a duty to
warn of the dangerous condition. See McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. HartmanHanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959).
49. Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 158 N.E.2d 691 (1959).

50, 338 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1960).
51 Enis, The Active-Passive Negligence Indemnity Theory, 30 Mo. L. Rv.
624, 625 (1965).
52. 338 S.W.2d at 8.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/10
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ous condition is a "classic example" of passive negligence,53 and that the
"mere motion" of the railroad car did not establish active negligence by the
4
railroad.5
In Western Cas. & Surety Co. v. Shell Oil Co.5 5 two teen-age girls
were injured in an explosion that occurred when one lit a match in the
restroom of a service station. An employee of Shell had been unloading
gasoline which caused dangerous fumes to accumulate in the restroom. The
girls brought an action against Shell and the service station operator, who
leased the station from Shell. Both Shell and the operator's insurer settled
the suit, and the operator's insurer brought a suit for indemnity against
Shell. The court stated that although the operator had been charged with
active negligence in the petition filed on behalf of the girls, the suit for
indemnity was a separate action based on a settlement and therefore the
character of the negligence was still to be determined.5 0 The court found
that the operator had not known about the danger51 and that Shell was
actively negligent in constructing ventilation pipes in close proximity to the
building at such height as to allow dangerous fumes to accumulate when
gas was unloaded. The court also found Shell actively negligent in failing
to warn the operator of the danger, and Shell's employee actively negligent
in discharging two grades of gasoline at once, thereby creating the dangerous accumulation of fumes. The insurance company prevailed on its
claim for indemnity.
In Hofstra v. Schriber58 plaintiff brought an action for indemnity
against an owner of a truck which had stalled on a highway, causing injury
to a motorist. The motorist had recovered a judgment against plaintiff,

who had been the driver of the truck at the time it stalled. Plaintiff alleged that the owner had negligently installed an unclean auxiliary tank
and failed to warn plaintiff about its condition. Plaintiff alleged it was

this active negligence that had caused the truck to stall and injure the
motorist. The trial court granted the owner's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. The Missouri Supreme Court found that
53. Id. at 6. See also RTATEMENT

oF RESTITUTION § 95 (1937).
54. Id. at 8.
55. 413 S.W.2d 550 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
56. Id. at 555.
57. There was some evidence that the operator had noticed the fumes accumulating around the restrooms but had done nothing to remedy the situation.
This would have constituted actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and
would have barred indemnity. See note 45 and accompanying text supra. The court
stated that section 88 of the Restatement of Restitution allows judicial discretion
to determine whether behavior of a tortfeasor bars indemnity, and that the operator in this case had been passively negligent. 413 S.W.2d at 556-57. That section
reads as follows:
A person who has discharged a tort claim to which he and another
were subject ... (b) is barred from restitution if his tort involved seriously
wrongful conduct.
The comment to (b) states "It is a matter for judicial discretion to determine
whether an act is so seriously wrongful as to bar restitution under the particular
circumstances."
58. 475 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1972).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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the verdict against plaintiff had been based on plaintiff's- negligence in allowing a stalled vehicle to remain on a traveled portion of the highway and
that such conduct constituted active negligence. The plaintiff argued that
the verdict was based on a mere failure to discover the condition that
caused the truck to stall, but the court stated that the interpretation of verdicts was a matter of law to be decided by the court, and plaintiff's active
negligence foreclosed his right to indemnification. 5 9
The active-passive negligence indemnity theory has been often criticized 0 and expressly rejected in some jurisdictions. 61 While its validity as
a method of achieving equity between tortfeasors may be questioned, it
remains well-entrenched in Missouri jurisprudence.
III. INDEMNITY IN THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY AREA

Products liability claims can be predicated on three theories of recovery-negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. 62 Similarly,
claims for indemnity in the products area may be based on any of these
three theories.0 3 Each theory involves different elements of proof, and not
all of the theories are applicable in every case.6 4 The theory of recovery
utilized by the injured party against a tortfeasor often dictates the theory
on which is based the claim for indemnity; however, a claim for indemnification may be predicated on the other theories.0 5 In any event, the
59. Id. at 46-47.
60. [I]t would seem that if the confusion that has arisen by attempting to
fit cases into bare cubicles of easy nomenclature is to be alleviated, it can
be done only by realizing that no rule really governs in the field of indemnity.
Comment, supra note 26, at 787. See also Meriam &cThornton, supra note 3;

Davis, supra note 2.
61. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d
288 (1972), discussed in part IV infra. Texas courts have adopted a theory based

on the duties owed one tortfeasor to the other, allowing a tortfeasor who has not
breached a duty owed to another tortfeasor indemnity if the latter has breached a
duty owed to the former, although both have breached a duty owed a third person. The Texas test has not successfully eliminated the confusion in indemnity
cases. See Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L.
REv. 150 (1947).
62. See Krauskopf, Products Liability, 32 Mo. L. Rxv. 459 (1967) (part I),
33 Mo. L. Rxv. 24 (1968) (part II).
63. See Sisco v. Nu Process Brake Engineers, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 658 (Mo.
1971) (indemnity petition could be construed to embrace all three theories of recovery).
64. For example, a wholesaler or other middleman would not be sued on a
negligence theory because he normally has no duty to inspect the product. In
such a case, the indemnity action would need to be predicated on a warranty
theory. See 3 FRUMER & FRIans&uA, PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 44.02[3] [a] (1975); Continental Cas. Co. v. Belknap Hardware ScMfg. Co., 281 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1955).
65. The claim that the injured party asserts against the tortfeasor will often
involve the same underlying facts and legal issues the tortfeasor would be required to prove in his case for indemnity. Thus, the tortfeasor often predicates his
claim for indemnity on the same legal theory utilized by the injured party. See 3
FRuMAR S FRmDiAN, PRODucrs LBrLITY § 44.03[5] (1975). But the tortfeasor
could predicate his indemnity claim on another theory. See, e.g., Sisco v. Nu Process Brake Engineers, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1971).
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tortfeasor-indemnitee should attempt to assert his claim for indemnity in
the suit brought against him by the injured party in order to avoid re-

litigating the same issues against the prospective indemnitor in a separate
action.66
This comment will not attempt to determine the theory of recovery
which a tortfeasor should employ when seeking indemnity in a products
liability case. What will be examined is the effect of the active-passive
negligence theory on a tortfeasor's right of indemnification when the tortfeasor's own liability is predicated on negligence, breach of warranty, and

strict liability.
A. The Indemnitee Liable in Negligence
It is beneficial for the purposes of analysis to divide prospective indemnitees into two classes: manufacturers of products which cause injury
and non-manufacturers-e.g., purchasers, users, and sellers of products held
liable for injuries caused by the products. Manufacturers are a disfavored
class in actions for indemnity.6 T Most courts view the creation of a defective product as active negligence, which prevents a manufacturer from
seeking indemnity from a tortfeasor who may also be responsible for injury
caused by the product.6s Thus, a manufacturer has been denied indemnity from another manufacturer whose product contributed to the
injury.69 A manufacturer's claim for indemnity asserted against purchasers
or users of a product is usually denied.7 0 One exception 7 ' to this strict
66. This can be done to a prospective indemnitor not already a party to the
suit by either "vouching in" or impleading the tortfeasor, and this will save the
indemnitee time and money. Wright, Procedure-ThirdParty Practice-NonContractualIndemnification, 28 Mo. L. Rv. 307, 308 (1963); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943
at § 2[b] (1969).
67. See generally 3 FRUMAR & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LmmiLiTY § 44.02[3] [d]
(1975); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943 (1969).
68. See, e.g., Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 498, 502, 301 N.E.2d
41, 45 (1973), affd, 57 Ill. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516 (1974) ("Sky Climber is the
manufacturer of the scaffold and therefore would be guilty of active negligence in
connection with all of the allegations against it in plaintiff's complaint"). But
some courts have allowed a manufacturer to prove a case of passive negligence.
See Goldstein v. Compudyne Corp., 262 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Stahlberg v.
Hannifin Corp., 157 F. Supp. 290 (N.D.N.Y. 1957); Lane v. Celanese Corp. of
America, 94 F. Supp. 528 (N.D.N.Y. 1950); Campbell v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co.,
65 Ill. App. 2d 139, 212 N.E.2d 512 (1965). Although a manufacturer may be
barred from indemnity, the manufacturer may still assert a right to contribution.
See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973).
69. Renuzit Home Products Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 207 F.2d 955 (3d
Cir. 1953).
70. See 3 FRuMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIAEILiTY § 44.02[3] [d] (1975);
Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943 at § 10 (1969).
71. Another exception may exist if a manufacturer has delegated the duty
to inspect the product manufactured to another and the other fails to discover
the defective product that causes the injury. See Guarnieri v. Kewanee-Ross Corp.,
270 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1959) (dictum). This would parallel results in non-products
cases. See note 47 and accompanying text supra. However, it is of questionable
validity given the unfavorable view courts have toward manufacturers in inPublished
by cases.
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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view is that indemnity is allowed when a manufacturer seeks indemnity
from a manufacturer of a component part,72 if the injury was caused by a
defect in the component part.73 The strict view disfavoring indemnification for a manufacturer in no way affects the manufacturer's right to assert
defenses which may establish no negligence and therefore no liability to
4

the injured party.7

In Johnson v. California Spray-Chemical Co.265 improperly packaged
chemicals leaked, resulting in loss of sight by a freight handler. He brought
an action against the manufacturer of the chemicals, alleging that the
chemicals were improperly manufactured

and packaged, and that the

manufacturer had failed to warn about the possibility of leakage. The
manufacturer filed a third-party petition seeking indemnity from the transportation company in charge of loading the chemicals, asserting that any

liability it suffered would result solely from the negligence of the transportation company. Upon sustaining a motion to dismiss the third-party
petition, the court held that because the manufacturer was charged with
active negligence, there could be no right to indemnity. The court also
found that the manufacturer's assertion against the transportation company was in effect an assertion of a defense to the plaintiff's action and
not a basis for a claim of indemnification.76
In Feinsteinv. Edward Livingston & Sons, Inc. 7 7 plaintiff was injured
at a car wash establishment following an explosion of a machine which
contained a defective "accumulator." Plaintiff sued the car wash establish-

ment alleging a breach of warranty and negligence in manufacturing, assembling, inspecting, and supplying a defective car wash system. Defendant filed a third-party petition seeking indemnity from the manufacturer
of the component accumulator. The trial court dismissed the third-party

petition, and defendant appealed. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed
and held that the allegations of plaintiff's petition and the third-party
petition demonstrated that relief could be granted for defendant against
72. See generally 3 FRUmER &-FRiEm~AN, PRoDucrs LmABLITy § 44.02[3] [e]
(1975).
73. In such cases the manufacturer is treated like a mere -purchaser of a defective chattel. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 21 Ill.
App. 3d 510, 316 N.E.2d 255 (1974).
74. See, e.g., Rideaux v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 285 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.
Texas 1968); Olson v. Village of Babbitt, 189 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. 1971).
75. 862 S.W.2d 630 (Mo. 1962).
76. Ordinarily, if there is any possibility that the right to indemnity could
be established at trial, the petition for indemnity should not be dismissed. See
notes 84-35 and accompanying text supra. However, because manufacturers are
categorized as per se actively negligent tortfeasors, courts are inclined to dismiss manufacturers' indemnity petitions because there would be no possibility of
establishing a right to indemnity at trial. See Johnson v. California Spray-Chemical
Co., 862 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. 1962); Lewis v. Amchem Products, Inc., 510 S.W.2d
46 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1974). Cf. State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Godfrey, 468
S.W.2d 693 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971) (trial court erred in dismissing non-manufacturer's third-party petition for indemnity because the right to. indemnity may
be established at trial).
77. 457 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1970).
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the manufacturer. The court found that plaintiff's petition embraced
theories of active and passive negligence, and if plaintiff submitted his
case against defendant on a passive negligence theory, defendant could
8
submit his claim for indemnity7
A more recent case demonstrates the strict view courts take toward a
manufacturer asserting a claim for indemnity. In Lewis v. Amchem Products, Inc. 79 farmers sued the manufacturer of a chemical which ruined
crops after the fields were sprayed with it by a crop duster. The trial court
dismissed the, manufacturer's third-party petition against the crop duster,
and the manufacturer appealed. The court found that the plaintiffs' allegations charged .the manufacturer with active negligence, and affirmed the
dismissal of the third-party petition. The court held that the manufacturer's third-party petition did no more than assert a defense to the plain80
tiffs' claim and was, not. a basis for an indemnity claim.
Johnson, Feinstein, and Lewis illustrate that the negligence of manufacturers is almost always deemed active negligence, except where a manufacturer seeks indemnity from one who has supplied him with a defective
component- part.8 1 Thus, in ,the majority of cases, manufacturers are foreclosed from asserting a claim for indemnity.
When a non-manufacturer is charged with negligence in a products
liability case, his right to recover indemnity from the supplier of the product will depend on the general considerations of the active-passive negligence theory, as discussed in part II, supra. A retailer who sells a defective product8 2 or an installer of a defective chattel 83 without knowledge
of the defect is merely passively negligent and entitled to indemnity from
the actively negligent manufacturer of the item. Purchasers (including
78. The court stated:
The allegations of the two petitions, when taken and considered
liberally together, and given all intendments favorable to the statement
of a claim foiindemnity .
granted....

.

. stated a claim upon which relief could be

475 S.W.2d at 793. It seems clear, however, that if plaintiff's petition had embraced only an allegation of active negligence, the third-party petition would have
been dismissed. See Kemach v. American Airlines, Inc., 226 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct.
1962).
79. 510 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1974).
80. The court recognized the principle of section 76 of the Restatement of
Restitution, quoted note 9 supra. 510 S.W.2d at 49.
81. But see cases cited note 68 supra, allowing a manufacturer to prove a
case of passive negligence against persons other than suppliers of defective component parts. Such cases are against the weight of authority in products liability
indemnity cases.
82. See, e~g., Woods v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., 361 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. 1962).
83. Installers of defective products are treated like suppliers of chattels. See,
e.g., Feinstein v; Edward'Livingston & Sons, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1970). Repairmen, on the other hand, are treated like manufacturers of products, and are
'virtually guarantors of their work. See Siebrand v. Eyerly Aircraft Co., 196 F. Supp.
936 (D. Ore. 1961);. De La Forest v. Yandle, 171 Cal. App. 2d 59, 340 P.2d 52
(1959). Negligent installation or repair of products constitutes active negligence.
See Listerman v. Day & Night Plumb. & Heating Serv., 384 S.W.2d 111 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1964);
3 FRUMER
&cFRIEDMAN,
PRODuars
LIABILITY
§ 44.02[3]
[c] (1975).
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employers) or users of defective products which cause injury to third persons are entitled to indemnity from suppliers or manufacturers of such
products, provided that the purchasers or users were without knowledge
of the defect and did not actively participate in the wrong.84 While nonmanufacturer suppliers are entitled to indemnity from their suppliers, attempts to recover indemnity from purchasers or users of the products
are treated like indemnity actions brought by manufacturers and are
85
generally unsuccessful.
Thus, in Woods v. Juvenile Shoe Corp. 86 a retailer was held liable
to a customer injured by a tack that protruded into the wearing surface of
a shoe. The retailer was allowed indemnity from the manufacturer of the
shoe based on the active-passive negligence theory, because the retailer
was only passively negligent in failing to discover the defect in the shoe.
Similarly, in Sisco v. Nu Process Brake Engineers, Inc.87 an installer of a
defective power duster that caused injury to a truck driver was allowed to
maintain an indemnity action against the supplier of the power cluster,
recovery to be granted on a showing that the unit was installed as was
supplied. In Simon v. Kansas Rug Co.88 a user of a rug cleaner that caused
personal injury was entitled to implead the supplier of a dangerous chemical.
It is dear that showing knowledge of the dangerous condition or active participation in the wrong on the part of a non-manufacturer will
preclude such persons from asserting a claim for indemnity. Such a showing constitutes active negligence and places the prospective indemnitee
in pari delicto with the creator of the dangerous condition.89 Thus, an injured third party who recovers from a non-manufacturer and proves active

negligence will preclude a later action by the non.manufacturer for indemnity against the manufacturer of a defective product. It may be questioned whether such a result is equitable. 90
84. See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943 (1969); 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,

§ 44.02[3] (1975). For a discussion of the impact of workmen's compensation statutes on indemnity actions, see Note, Contribution and
Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. RIv. 959
(1956).
85. See, e.g., Noncek v. Ram Tool Corp., 129 Ill. App. 2d 320, 264 N.E.2d
440 (1970); Gilbert v. Barouch, 10 App. Div. 984, 202 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1960).
86., 361 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. 1962).
87. 462 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1971).
88. 460 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1970). The court recognized the principle of section
93 (1) of the Restatement of Restitution:
Where a person has supplied to another a chattel which because of
the supplier's negligence or other fault is dangerously defective for the use
for which it is supplied and both have become liable in tort to a third
PRoDucrs LuItIrry

person injured by such use, the supplier is under a duty to indemnify

the other for expenditures properly made in discharge of the claim of the
third person, if the other used or disposed of the chattel in reliance
upon the supplier's care, and if, as between the two, such reliance was
justifiable.
460 S.W.2d at 599.
89. See generally 3 FRuMER &FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIAmLITY § 44.04 (1975).
90. To illustrate the inequities which may result from the application of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/10
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A tortfeasor held liable for negligence may assert a claim for indemnity based on a warranty theory.91 Doing so requires the indemnitee
to prove a case in warranty"2 and subjects him to all applicable defenses. 93
But the right of indemnification based on warranty is still determined
by the active-passive negligence theory. A tortfeasor's active negligence
precludes his claim for indemnity from one who has breached a warranty
owed the tortfeasor. 94 Stated conversely, only a tortfeasor guilty of passive
negligence may recover on an indemnity claim predicated on a breach of
warranty. 95
An early Missouri case applied the principle of the active-passive
negligence theory to an indemnity action based on breach of warranty.
In Busch & Latta Paint Co. v. Woermann Const. Co.96 plaintiff paint company asked defendant construction company to build a scaffold, to be used
the active-passive negligence indemnity theory, consider the following fact situation. A manufacturer of a dangerous product sells the product to an employer, and
gives the employer instructions regarding the proper use of the product. The
employer assigns an employee to use the product but fails to instruct the employee
about the proper precautions to be taken when using the product. The employee
suffers injury from using the product. If the manufacturer is sued, its negligence
in creating the dangerous product is active negligence and will preclude the
manufacturer from seeking indemnity from the employer. On the other hand
(assuming no workmen's compensation act), if the employee sues the employer
for failing to warn the employee of the danger, the fact that the employer knew
about the danger would preclude the employer from seeking indemnity from the
manufacturer of the dangerous product. Thus, in this situation, where the ultimate
liability will fall depends on which tortfeasor the employee elects to sue.
A fair result could be obtained by allowing contribution between the em.
ployer and manufacturer, thereby requiring each to bear its own responsibility
for the injury. See Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382,
282 N.E.2d 288 (1972), discussed in part IV infra. But in Missouri, the right to
contribution which is essential to the only fair result in this situation, is subject
to the requirements of a statute. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
91. See, e.g., Simon v. Kansas City Rug Co., 460 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1970).
92. Of course, a tortfeasor in a warranty action need not prove negligence.
See, e.g., Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa
1970).
93. See Nelson v. Swedish Hospital, 241 Minn. 551, 64 N.W.2d 38 (1954),
where recovery of indemnity was foreclosed by a disclaimer in a sales contract.
However, indemnity on a warranty theory may permit a recovery of attorneys'
fees and costs of litigation. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co.,
326 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
94. See, e.g., Ambrose v. Standard Oil Co., 214 F. Supp. 872 (D. Ore. 1963).
It has been said that to allow an actively negligent tortfeasor to recover indemnity on a warranty would violate the spirit of the law of indemnity. See
Vanderveer v. Tyrrell, 27 App. Div. 2d 958, 278 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1967). Thus,
knowledge of the defective condition will preclude indemnity on a warranty theory.
Rekab, Inc. v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., Inc., 261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107 (1971). For
the right of a tortfeasor held liable in warranty to recover indemnity on a war.
ranty theory, see part III, section B infra.
95. See Busch & Latta Paint Co. v. Woermann Const. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276
S.W. 614 (1925); United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Balcrank, Inc., 175 Ohio St. 267,
193 N.E.2d 920 (1963). See also cases allowing recovery of indemnity by a tortfeasor held liable on a warranty theory from their suppliers based on the same
warranty, discussed in part III, section B infra.
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by plaintiff's employees while painting the interior of a building. The defendant built the scaffold, using nails instead of bolts in its construction.
The scaffold gave way and injured paint company employees, who settled
with plaintiff and defendant for their injuries. Plaintiff then sought indemnity from the construction company, based on a breach of an implied
warranty of fitness. The court found plaintiff had relied on the expert
skills of defendant in constructing the scaffold and had failed to inspect
the scaffold and discover its dangerous propensity. The court implied that
active negligence of the plaintiff, if it existed, would bar the claim for
indemnity:
The plaintiff's negligence, for which its employees had a right to
recover, was a failure to inspect the scaffold and be sure it was
safe .... The defendant's negligence was in manufacturing and
furnishing for a specific purpose a structure which was unfit
when defendant was bound to know whether it was suitable for
such purpose ....
It follows that the defendant in this case was
primarily liable for injuries caused by the defects in the scaffold.9 7
Plaintiff was allowed indemnity from the defendant based on a breach of
warranty.
Rekab, Inc. v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., Inc. 98 demonstrates that an indemnitee's knowledge of the dangerous condition bars indemnity based on
a breach of warranty. Plaintiff was an operator of an amusement park
and defendant had manufactured and supplied a ride which had collapsed
causing injuries to patrons. Plaintiff settled with the patrons and brought
an action for indemnity based upon a breach of warranty. Evidence disclosed that defendant manufacturer had warned plaintiff of the dangerous
condition of the ride, but plaintiff had not remedied it. The court held
that plaintiff had knowledge of the defect and therefore could not assert
a claim for indemnity. 99
The effect of the active-passive negligence theory on a tortfeasor's
right of indemnification based on a theory of strict liability will be considered in subsection C, infra.
B. The Indemnitee Liable in Warranty
Normally, a tortfeasor held liable on a warranty theory predicates a
claim for indemnity on a warranty theory.100 The general rule is that
97. 810 Mo. at 489; 276 S.W. at 619.
98. 261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107 (1971).
99. See also First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Otis Elevator Co., 2 Ariz. App. 80,
406 P.2d 430 (1965), reh. denied, 2 Ariz. App. 84, 411 P.2d 34 (1966); Vanderveer
v. Tyrrell, 27 App. Div. 2d 958, 278 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Burns v.
Pennsylvania Rubber &Supply Co., 117 Ohio App. 12, 189 N.E.2d 645 (1961).
100. Theoretically, the indemnity action could also be brought on a negligence
theory, but this is seldom done. 8 FRuiR & FRiEDMAN, PRODUcrs LxLAair~r
§ 44.08[6] (1975). In this regard, one case had indicated that breach of an express warranty is active negligence, whereas breach of an implied warranty is
passive negligence. Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 898 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.
1968). In any event, it seems unlikely that a seller of a product would be able
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/10
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"a retailer or other seller suffering and paying a judgment against him
by an injured person in a warranty action is entitled to indemnity from a
manufacturer [or other seller] who sold the product to him with a similar
warranty."'' o It has been suggested in such cases that the active-passive
negligence theory is not applicable, 02 but an argument could be made
that selling a chattel with knowledge of its defectiveness should preclude
03
indemnity in this situation.'
Indemnity is often sought based on a warranty theory by every seller
in the distributive chain. This results in the manufacturer bearing the
ultimate liability for injuries caused by defects in the product.104 In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co.105 plaintiff-retailer brought
an action against a wholesaler to recover for damages incurred from consumer claims based on the sale of contaminated cheese. The wholesaler
impleaded the manufacturer of the cheese and sought indemnity. The
evidence demonstrated that the cheese was contaminated prior to delivery to the wholesaler. The court held that section 400.2-314, RSMo
1969,106 entitled the wholesaler to recover indemnity, as well as attorneys'
fees, from the manufacturer as proper "consequential damages" resulting
from the breach of warranty.
C. Strict Liability and the Right of Indemnification
A tortfeasor found strictly liable may assert an indemnity claim
against another based on strict liability.107 The doctrine of strict liability
imposes liability on tortfeasors without a determination of negligence.' 08
Thus, it has been held that when a tortfeasor asserts a claim for indemnity
based on a strict liability theory, the question of active or passive negligence is not present. 09 However, when a tortfeasor found strictly liable
to assert a claim for indemnity against a purchaser or user of the product. See
Gilbert v. Barouch, 10 App. Div. 2d 984, 202 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (breach
of duty of reasonable care by sellers of dangerous products is active negligence).
Indemnity has been sought by tortfeasors held liable on a warranty theory on the
basis of strict liability. See, e.g., Penker Const. Co. v. Finley, 485 S.W.2d 244 (Ky.

1972).

101. 3 FRurm&r &:F-RDMAN, PRODUors LIABILITY § 44.03[1], at 15-45 (1975).
See Grummons v. Zollinger, 189 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Ind. 1960).
102. Schipper v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 278 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
103. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.

104. See, e.g., Texas Motorcoaches v. A.C.F. Motors Co., 154 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.

1946); Hellenbrand v. Bowan, 16 Wis. 2d 264, 114 N.W.2d 418 (1962).
105. 326 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
106. Section 400.2-314, RSMo 1969, is based on the Uniform Commercial
Code and sets forth the elements of an implied warranty of merchantibility.
107. See, e.g, Greco v.. Buccioni Eng. Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967),

affrd, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969).

108. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at § 103. Missouri has adopted REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) Op TORTs § 402A (1965). See Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 411 S.W.2d
443 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
109. See Texaco Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 I1. App. 2d 351, 358, 254
N.E.2d 584, 588 (1969):

manifests
a School
strongofpublic
policy Repository,
that insists1976
upon the distriPublished by[This]
University
of Missouri
Law Scholarship

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 10
1976]

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

seeks indemnity based on other theories, the result reflects notions of the
active-passive negligence theory.
Like manufacturers subject to the active-passive negligence theory,
manufacturers in strict liability cases are disfavored indemnitees. Manufacturers found strictly liable cannot assert a claim for indemnity against
anyone except another manufacturer which supplied a defective component
part.110 The prohibition is based on a policy that requires creators of defective products to bear the ultimate responsibility for injuries produced."1 1
The fact that a purchaser or user may have contributed to the injury is not
a basis upon which a manufacturer may predicate a claim for indemnity, although misuse of a product is a recognized defense in a strict liability
action."12
Most of the cases which have considered the impact of strict liability
on a manufacturer's right of indemnification have arisen in Illinois. In
Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc.113 a widow sued the manufacturer of a scaffold
which had collapsed, killing her husband. The suit was based on both
strict liability and negligence. The manufacturer filed a third-party petition seeking indemnity from the employer of the decedent, alleging that
bution of the economic burden in the most socially desirable manner,
even to the extent of ignoring the indemnitee's fault.
Query whether allowing an actively negligent tortfeasor to recover indemnity on
a strict liability theory violates the spirit of the law of indemnity. See note 94
supra.

110. See notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra. Manufacturers held strictly
liable are in effect treated as actively negligent tortfeasors, and thus are foreclosed from seeking indemnity from purchasers or users of products. See, e.g.,
Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 498, 301 N.E.2d 41 (1973). However,
claims predicated on strict liability may be asserted against sellers of products, and
thus a manufacturer held strictly liable could assert an indemnity claim based on
a strict liability theory against one who supplied him with a defective chattel.
See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. 8 Tool Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 510,
316 N.E.2d 255 (1974).
111. See Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 498, 504-05, 301 N.E.2d
41, 46 (1973):
Sky Climber is the manufacturer and distributor of this product and
therefore presumably the one who reaped the profits from its manufacture.
Hence, the ultimate liability, if there be one because of a defective or
unreasonably dangerous condition of the product when it left the manufacturer's possession, should rest upon Sky Climber as creator of the
product.
112. Misuse of the product can be proved as a defense to strict liability
actions. See, e.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 IM. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305
(1970); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and
Assumption of the Risk, 25 VAND. L. R.v. 93 (1972). However, it has been
held that the intervening acts of another may not be used by the manufacturer as
a basis for an indemnity action. See Kuziw v. Lake Eng. Co., 398 F. Supp. 961, 963
(N.D. Ill. 1975):
Defendant manufacturer may allege that the intervening act of another party or plaintiff himself was the proximate cause of the injury complained of. It is not, however, a basis upon which a third party user may
be brought into the action. Indemnity is not obtainable in strict liability
cases as against the user.
See also Kossifos v. Louden Mach. Co., 22 I1. App. 3d 587, 317 N.E.2d 749 (1974).
113. 13 Ill. App. 3d 498, 301 N.E.2d 41 (1973).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/10

18

Baylard: Baylard: Products Liability--Non-Contractual Indemnity
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

it had instructed the employer on the proper care and maintenance of the
product, and through actively negligent conduct the employer had made
the scaffold dangerous. The court dismissed the third-party petition for
two reasons. The first was that where a manufacturer is being sued, "it
follows necessarily that the basis of the liability would be the active creation of the defect in the process of manufacture."'114 The second was based
on a policy that requires creators of defective products to bear the
"ultimate liability" for resultant injuries. 1 5 The decision was affirmed on
appeal. 11
In Kossifos v. Louden Mach. Co.11 plaintiff sued a manufacturer on
a strict liability theory for injuries caused by one of the manufacturer's
products which had been installed by the plaintiff's employer. The issue
was whether a manufacturer was entitled to indemnity from an intermediate tortfeasor based on the active-passive negligence theory. The court in
strong language answered in the negative:
In the instant case [the manufacturer] seeks to use the
[active-passive negligence] exception against [the employer]. But
the exception applies only where the two tortfeasors are tortfeasors
owing to their respective negligence, because the theory essentially involves a comparing of negligences to determine the more
causative fault of the same type. Here, however, [the manufacturer's] potential liability is not based on negligence, and the
theory is therefore inapplicable. The theory of "active-passive negligence" is not applicable to compare apples with oranges. 118
The court declared that strict liability is "a more serious tort than the
tort of ordinary negligence""19 and recognized the policy of allowing the
creator of the defective product to bear the ultimate liability. 20 The
language of the Kossifos court indicates a strong policy that manufacturers
should bear the ultimate responsibility for injuries caused by defective
products.
114. Id. at 503, 301 N.E.2d at 45.
115. See note 11 supra.
116. Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516 (1974). The
Illinois Supreme Court did not conclusively answer the question whether a manufacturer could ever assert a claim for indemnity based on the active-passive negligence indemnity theory. But subsequent cases that have considered the issue have
held that manufacturers cannot, based on the nature of strict liability and on
the general policy that does not allow a manufacturer to seek indemnity from subsequent users or purchasers. See Kuziw v. Lake Eng'r Co., 398 F. Supp. 961 (N.D.
IIl. 1975); Stanfield v. Medalist Industries, Inc, 17 Ill. App.3d 996, 809 N.E.2d
104 (1974).
117. 22 Ill. App. 3d 587, 317 N.E.2d 749 (1974).
118. Id. at 598, 817 N.E.2d at 752.
119. Id. at 593, 317 N.E.2d at 753.
120. Id. at 592, 317 N.E.2d at 752-53. While the court determined that the
manufacturer could not seek indemnity on the active-passive negligence indemnity
theory against a subsequent user, it left open the question whether a claim for
indemnity could be asserted on the basis of "misuse" of the product. Id. at 592,
817 N.E.2d at 753. Subsequent cases have said that a claim of misuse is merely a
defense and not a basis for an indemnity claim. Kuziw v. Lake Eng'r Co., 398
F. Supp. 961 (N.D. I1. 1975); Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., Inc., 17 111. App. 3d 996,
809 N.E.2d
104 (1974).
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Non-manufacturers held liable on a strict liability theory may assert
indemnity claims based on strict liability against their suppliers.'12 The

negligence of users' 2 2 and assemblers 23 of products will not be considered in a claim for indemnity based on a manufacturer's strict liability.
If the language of the Kossifos court is followed, non-manufacturing
suppliers, as well as manufacturing suppliers, of chattels sued on strict

liability would be unable to assert a defense based on the active-passive
negligence theory against prospective indemnitees. 12 4 An actively negligent
tortfeasor would be able to recover indemnity based on wrongs in which
he participated by showing defectiveness of a product. Such a result clearly
violates the policy of fairness courts have tried to foster through the doctrine of indemnity.125
IV.

NEW YORK ABANDONS THE
THEORY

AcTniv-PAssivE

NEGLIGENCE

OF INDEMNIFICATION

The New York Court of Appeals had an opportunity to reexamine the
-2
active-passive negligence indemnity theory in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. 1 6
A widow sued Dow, a manufacturer of chemicals, after her husband died
from breathing poisonous fumes. The employer of the decedent has used
a chemical to fumigate a storage bin and then directed decedent to dean
the room. Decedent died shortly thereafter. Plaintiff alleged that Dow
was negligent in failing to warn of the danger and to instruct in the safe
use of the chemical. Dow impleaded decedent's employer and sought indemnity, asserting that Dow had adequately warned the employer by
121. See, e.g., Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967),
aff'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969); Rogers v. Karem, 405 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1966);
Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
122. Kuziw v. Lake Eng'r Co., 398 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. I1. 1975); Stanfield
v. Medalist Indus., Inc., 17 Il. App. 3d 996, 309 N.E.2d 104 (1974); Chapman
Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).
123. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. c Tool Co., 21 Inl. App.
3d 510, 316 N.E.2d 255 (1974).
124. Two courts have compared "apples with oranges," however, when strict
liability was asserted against a retailer. One court denied an actively negligent tortfeasor indemnity from the retailer, Schuster v. Steedley, 406 S.W.2d 387 (Ky.
1966), and the second court allowed a retailer held liable in strict liability to
recover indemnification from an actively negligent installer. Mixter v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 224 Pa. Super. 313, 308 A.2d 139 (1973). These cases demonstrate the
different views courts take toward non-manufacturer suppliers. The dissent in
Mixter stated that finding a tortfeasor strictly liable says nothing about the character of negligence when indemnity is sought:
While the burden of showing negligence is eliminated, this does
not mean that a seller of a defective product is necessarily without fault or
free of negligence. While the degree of proof is lessened as between the
plaintiff and the seller-defendant, such is not the case as between the
seller and a third party defendant seeking indemnity.
224 Pa. Super. at 324, 308 A.2d at 145 (dissenting opinion).
125. Nothing would prevent a manufacturer from seeking contribution from
a tortfeasor who contributed to the injury. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Carborundum
Co., 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973). But that right in Missouri is a statutory one and
therefore a limited one. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
126. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 882, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972).
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labeling the chemical and furnishing supplemental materials, and that
the employer was actively negligent in failing to follow the instructions
and take precautionary measures. The trial court dismissed the third-

party petition because the manufacturer had been charged with active
negligence.
The New York Court of Appeals agreed that the active-passive negligence indemnity theory dictated that the indemnity petition be dismissed.
But the court said that the persistent criticism of the active-passive negligence theory required the court to reexamine the concept. The court said
that the purpose of indemnification is to achieve fairness between the parties, a result not always achieved under the active-passive negligence theory:
[T]he policy problem involves more than terminology. If indemnity is allowed at all among joint tortfeasors, the important
resulting question is how ultimate responsibility should be distributed. There are situations when the facts would warrant what
Dow here seeks-passing on to [the employer] all responsibility
that may be imposed on Dow for negligence, a traditional full indemnity. There are circumstances where the facts would not, by
the same test of fairness, warrant passing on to a third party any
of the liability imposed. There are circumstances which would
justify apportionment of responsibility between third-party plain27
tiff and third-party defendant, in effect a partial indemnity.1
The court declared that the evolution of the active-passive negligence
theory and the New York contribution statute' 28 indicated a judicial and
legislative intent to abrogate the inflexible prohibition against indemnity
that existed at common law. To further that intent and achieve fairness
between the parties, the court adopted an apportioning process based on
the relative fault of the parties:
[W]here a third party is found to have been responsible for
a part, but not all, of the negligence for which a defendant is cast
in damages, the responsibility for that part is recoverable by the
prime defendant against the third party. 29
The court declared that the apportionment of fault between tortfeasors is
a function of the jury, and the trial court was given discretion to combine
the tortfeasor's action with the original action or try it separately13 0
New York under Dole has become a jurisdiction which allows tort127. Id. at 147, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386, 282 N.E.2d at 291.
128. N.Y. Civ. PAc. § 1401 (McKinney 1972). This statute contains the same
limitations as the contribution statute in Missouri, and thus would have required
a joint judgment before the manufacturer could seek to recoup any of the loss.
The Dole decision permits contribution where the facts require it to achieve justice
between the parties. See Coons v. Washington Mirror Works, 344 F. Supp. 653

(S.D.N.Y. 1972).

,129. 30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 387, 282 N.E.2d at 292.
130. The decision of the trial judge should be based on fairness: "Whether
the causes are tried together or separately would rest in the court's discretion, according to the requirements of fairness in the judicial management of the case."
N.E.2dRepository,
at 295. 1976
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feasors contribution based on relative fault.' 3 ' Since Dole, contribution has
been allowed between a negligent tortfeasor and one who had breached a
warranty'8 2 and will undoubtedly be extended to encompass tortfeasors

held strictly liable. 133 Tortfeasors in New York can now expect to bear their
share of responsibility to injured third persons. Whether a tortfeasor can
recover full indemnity from another will be determined through a fault
34
weighing process by a jury.
V. CONCLUSION

The doctrine of indemnification is based on the concept of restitution.
Its purpose is to achieve fairness between parties responsible to aggrieved
third persons. The active-passive negligence indemnity theory evolved as
an attempt to adjust the equities between tortfeasors. However, the application of the theory often does not result in a fair allocation of loss between tortfeasors. Therefore, Missouri courts should adopt the Dole approach and allow contribution between tortfeasors without requiring
that they be subject to a joint judgment. 135 A jury could then allocate
131. The rule of Dole has been extended to cases other than those involving
products liability. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 184 (1973). For a general discussion of
the Dole decision, see 3 FRuIMr.R & FRIEDmAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 44.02[4] (1975).
182. Coons v. Washington Mirror Works, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (the court said the Dole rationale is "primarily interested in equitably apportioning the responsibility for wrong-doing between the jointly liable wrongdoers.").
133. Cf. Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973). One
commentator states that strict liability of the manufacturer is justified because of
the control a manufacturer has on the product it puts into the stream of commerce, but suggests that a manufacturer should be allowed to recoup some of its
loss from intervening tortfeasors over which it has no control and which have
contributed to the injury. Zaremski, Expansion of Third Party Recovery: Common
Law Indemnity, Contribution or ?, 1975 ILL. B. J. 684 (1975).
134. Full indemnity would still be possible under proper circumstances. See 3
FRUmiER FRIumsm , PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 44.02[4] (1975).
135. One commentator has stated that allowing the impleading of a tort-

feasor for contribution purposes would violate the legislative intent of the Missouri contribution statute. Icenogle, Contribution in Missouri Between TortFeasors:How Affected by Third-Party Practice, Cross-Claims, and Consolidationof
Actions, 13 Mo. L. REv. 223, 224 (1948). But nothing could prevent the Missouri
courts from applying the rationale of the Dole court by recognizing the statute as
an attempt by the legislature to achieve a just result between the parties and
furthering that intent by allowing contribution between tortfeasors without the
requirement of a joint judgment. Allowing liability to be distributed on the
basis of relative fault is the trend in American jurisprudence. See Annot., 53
A.L.R.d 184 (1973); Zaremski, supra note 133. Moreover, Missouri courts have
recognized that fairness between tortfeasors is the purpose of contribution:
The doctrine of contribution is not founded on contract, but is based
on the principle that equality of burden as to a common right is equity,
and that whenever there is a common right the burden is also common.
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Farmer's Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 224, 226 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1970). It must be realized that the active-passive negligence indemnity
theory is not a formula that can achieve fairness in all actions between tortfeasors. The right to seek recoupment of loss "should be capable of development
to meet perceived requirements for just solutions in questions involving multiple
tortfeasors." Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 89, 302 N.E.2d 40, 43 (1973).
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